Magic  or Misery?: HBCUs, Guarantee Contracts, and Public Policy by Lillig, John
DePaul Journal of Sports Law 
Volume 6 
Issue 1 Fall 2009 Article 3 
"Magic" or Misery?: HBCUs, Guarantee Contracts, and Public 
Policy 
John Lillig 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp 
Recommended Citation 
John Lillig, "Magic" or Misery?: HBCUs, Guarantee Contracts, and Public Policy, 6 DePaul J. Sports L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 41 (2009) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp/vol6/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Sports Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
"MAGIC" OR MISERY?: HBCUS, GUARANTEE
CONTRACTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
John Lillig*
I hate it. I wish we didn't have to play those games. . . I think some-
where down the line, our conference, our institutions have to come
up with some type of way so we don't have to play those games and
take that money .. . I don't care what you say, I don't think you get
better getting beat by 30 points.
Larry Wright, Head Men's Basketball Coach,
Grambling State University, 2007.1
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2009, the University of Arkansas-Pine Bluff (UAPB)
men's basketball team began its Southwestern Athletic Conference
(SWAC) 2 season with a 74-52 home victory over Mississippi Valley
State University (MVSU). 3 While UAPB still had eighteen games re-
maining in a campaign that would last another three months, that first
win of 2009 signaled a new beginning for the Golden Lions. Prior to
its triumph over the Delta Devils, UAPB was 1-10.4 It had played all
of its games on the road. Furthermore, many of its losses were lop-
sided, including fifty-point losses at the hands of Purdue University
(90-40) and the University of Missouri (95-41).5
Despite suffering defeat at the hands of the Golden Lions on that
early January night in Pine Bluff, the Delta Devils might have been
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, DePaul University College of Law. The author would like to thank
his wife Anna Lee, and his children Eun Hae and Tae Won Lillig.
1. Andy Glockner, SWAC schools tired of guaranteed-game blowouts, ESPN, Sept. 13, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2987875.
2. SWAC member schools include Alabama A & M, Alabama State, Alcorn State, Grambling
State, Jackson State, Mississippi Valley State, Prairie View A & M, Southern University, Texas
Southern and Arkansas-Pine Bluff. See SWAC, http://www.swac.org/ (last visited January 21,
2009). All are HBCUs (see infra Section II).
3. Uapblionsroar.com, Lions Open 2009 With Mighty Roar, Jan. 3, 2009, http://www.uapblions
roar.comlnews/2009/1/3/MBB_0103090032.aspx?path=mbball.
4. Doug Crise, SWAC teams feel lost on the road, ARK. DEM. GAZ., January 3, 2009, http://
www.nwanews.com/adg/Sports/248384.
5. Uapblionsroar.com, 2008-2009 Men's Basketball Schedule, http://www.uapblionsroar.com/
schedule.aspx?path=mbball&schedule=14& (last visited February 13, 2009).
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able to commiserate. Before the game with UAPB, MVSU was 0-13.6
It had played all but one game on the road. And its losses included a
forty-point loss to Georgia and a fifty-one-point loss to Washington
State.7 In fact, the entire SWAC needed a breather. On January 3 the
ten conference teams' combined record stood at 15-101.8
This conference-wide ineptitude resulted from the systematic sched-
uling of so-called "guarantee games," in which lower-tier NCAA Divi-
sion 19 conference schools contract with high-ranking Division I
schools from "major" or BCS conferences10 for large payouts. Many
basketball" teams from mid- and lower-tier Division I conferences
rely on guarantee games to finance their programs, and sometimes
their school's entire athletic programs. Most affected, however are
the historic and significant HBCUs, or Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, which currently make up two of the most disadvantaged
Division I athletic conferences.12
6. Mvsu.edu, Men's Basketball Team Statistics, http://www.mvsu.edu/athletics/mensbasket
ball/teamstat.htm (last visited February 6, 2009).
7. Id.
8. Crise, supra note 4.
9. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a voluntary association of mem-
ber colleges and universities "through which the nation's colleges and universities govern their
athletic programs." NCAA, About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaaContentlD=2 (last
visited January 22, 2009). NCAA members are divided into Divisions I, II, and Ill. Division I
schools are required to sponsor more sports and offer more financial aid than Division II and III
schools, and must meet attendance minimums for football. NCAA, The Differences Between
Divisions I, II, and III, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=418 (last visited January 22,
2009).
10. The Bowl Championship Series ("BCS") is an arrangement between major Division I
football schools whereby the champions of six conferences ("BCS conferences") and two other
teams are selected to play in four major "Bowl" games at the end of the season. NCAA, Bowl
Championship Series, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=40459 (last visited January 22,
2009). The BCS ranks teams and selects the top two for a so-called "national championship"
game. The BCS has drawn criticism because it is often unclear if the "champion" is truly the best
team in the country, and drawn allegations of antitrust violations because teams from non-BCS
conferences rarely get selected for its games. For example, after the 2009 season, Utah (13-0), of
the Mountain West, a non-BCS conference, was the only undefeated Division I team, but was
not selected for the "national championship" game. Both Utah attorney general Mark Shurtleff
and then-President-elect Barack Obama questioned that result. BCS coordinator: system in com-
pliance, ESPN, Jan. 8, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncflbowls08/news/story?id=3818921. BCS
conference identification is relevant when discussing sports other than football because of the
large streams of money available to BCS conference schools through their football teams' partic-
ipation in the BCS. (See Bowl Championship Series, supra). The six BCS conferences are the
Southeastern, Big Ten, Big 12, Big East, Pac-10 and Atlantic Coast. BCS Coordinator, supra.
11. "Basketball" in this article will refer to Men's College Basketball unless otherwise
specified.
12. In addition to the SWAC (See supra note 2), the other HBCU Division I conference is the
Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference ("MEAC") whose member schools include Bethune-Cook-
man, Coppin State, Delaware State, Florida A & M, Hampton, Howard, Maryland-Eastern
Shore, Morgan State, Norfolk State, North Carolina A & T, South Carolina State, and Winston-
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Guarantee contracts provide valuable funds for cash-strapped ath-
letic departments, but they result in repeated, demoralizing blowout
losses for teams and arduous road trips away from classes for players
and coaches. Most insidiously, reliance on guarantee contracts assures
both continued funding for athletic programs and the unlikelihood
that those programs will succeed. As a result, some guarantee con-
tract terms may be unconscionable or void as against public policy.
Even if guarantee contracts are legally enforceable, alternate strate-
gies of contracting, based on HBCU football games and some basket-
ball tournaments, may help HBCUs break away from the cycle of
adversity that currently afflicts them on and off the basketball court-
an adversity profoundly at odds with their prestige and historic pasts.
A remedy, whatever its nature, is sorely needed. According to SWAC
Commissioner Duer Sharp, "We cannot continue to have this
situation."' 3
II. BACKGROUND
Identification as an HBCU is an official United States government
designation. According to the Higher Education Act of 1965, an
HBCU is
any historically black college or university that was established prior
to 1964, whose principal mission was, and is, the education of black
Americans, and that is accredited by a nationally recognized accred-
iting agency or association determined by the Secretary [of Educa-
tion] to be a reliable authority as to the quality of training offered or
is, according to such an agency or association, making reasonable
progress toward accreditation. 14
The White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Uni-
versities lists ninety four-year HBCUs currently in existence.15 Four-
Salem State. Meacsports.com, Member Institutions, http://www.meacsports.com/ (last visited on
January 21, 2009). One measure of the two conferences' relative competitive weakness is that a
MEAC or SWAC school has played in the NCAA Division I Men's Basketball tournament
opening-round game (the so-called "play-in game"), featuring the two lowest-ranked tourna-
ment qualifiers, each year from 2002-08. See Marc Carig, Battling Against 'Stigma' of Play-In,
WASH. PosT, March 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/
10/AR2007031000825_pf.html; see also Mount St. Mary's pulls away from Coppin State, ESPN,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/recap?gameld=280782154. The NCAA Division I
Men's Basketball tournament is discussed further at note 28 infra.
13. Crise, supra note 4.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1061(2)(as amended 2008).
15. U.S. Department of Education, List of HBCUs-White House Initiative on Historically
Black Colleges and Universities, http://www.ed.gov/about/inits/list/whhbcu/edlite-list.html (last
visited February 13, 2009) [hereinafter List].
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teen percent of all African American students in higher education are
enrolled in HBCUs.' 6
A. The Cultural and Athletic Tradition of HBCUs
On March 16, 2008, ESPN 7 debuted Black Magic, a four-hour, two-
part film that "tells the story of the injustice that characterized the
civil rights movement in America as told through the lives of basket-
ball players and coaches who attended historically black colleges and
universities."18 In conjunction with the film, ESPN.com published a
list of the Top 10 All-Time HBCU players; the list included such
NBAl 9 stars as Earl Monroe and Willis Reed. 20
Black Magic documents the key role that HBCU teams played in
the development of modern basketball. Black players, who were sys-
tematically excluded from the all-white campuses of mid-20th century
universities, instead brought their talents to HBCUs. 2 1 The film "per-
suasively argues that basketball in the 1940s and 1950s at what we now
call historically black colleges and universities-programs like Tennes-
see State, Winston-Salem and Bethune-Cookman-was faster-paced
on offense and more determined on defense." 22 Strategic innovations
by coaches such as John McLendon and players such as Monroe, Reed
and Elgin Baylor helped push the game into the modern era, creating
the fast-paced, entertaining style that characterizes modern
basketball. 23
The unique identity and pride forged in these troubling times can
still be glimpsed at some HBCU athletic events. ESPN annually tele-
vises the conference tournament of the Division II Central Intercolle-
giate Athletic Association (CIAA), 24 the nation's oldest league of
16. U.S. Department of Education, White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, http://www.ed.gov/aboutlinits/list/whhbcu/edlite-index.html (last visited February
13, 2009).
17. ESPN (Entertainment and Sports Programming Network, Inc.), is a television network
founded in 1979 that broadcasts more than 65 sports. Encyclopaedia Britannica, ESPN, Inc.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/l92762/ESPN-Inc (last visited February 6, 2009).
ESPN.com is ESPN's official web site.
18. HBCU All-Time Top 10 Basketball Players, ESPN, Mar. 5, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncb/news/story?id=3276757.
19. National Basketball Association.
20. HBCU All-Time Top-10, supra note 18.
21. Aaron Barnhart, 'Black Magic': Only the lines were white, TVBARN.COM, http://blogs.kan
sascity.com/tvbarn/2008/03/black-magic-onl.htmi (last visited February 6, 2009).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. CIAA members include Bowie State, Chowan (A football-only member and the only non-
HBCU,) Elizabeth City State, Fayetteville State, Johnson C. Smith, Livingstone, Saint Augus-
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historically black schools. 2 5 The CIAA tournament symbolizes the
unique combination of school pride, cultural celebration and athletic
tradition often alive at HBCU athletic events. The tournament serves
''as a giant reunion for alumni and friends of historically black colleges
and universities." 2 6 Held in Charlotte, North Carolina in 2008, the
CIAA tournament was expected to be more lucrative to the local
economy than the ACC2 7 tournament or the NCAA Tournament East
Regional. 28
B. The Modern Financial Plight of HBCUs
Despite their storied history and governmental recognition,
HBCUs' athletic departments are struggling. "Frustration is palpable
among HBCU athletic administrators, exhausted from trying to
stretch a dollar and keep flailing programs alive with little to no help
from the university, graduates, or even the state."29 While former
HBCU athletes and administrators at the January, 2008 NCAA con-
vention spoke of pride and resourcefulness, "pluck and moxie only
gets you so far, particularly in a world ruled by dollars and cents."30
According to ESPN.com writer Dana O'Neil, "There is a genuine and
legitimate fear that. . .[HBCUs]. . . are in a battle they are no longer
equipped to fight and that the proud programs of the past could disap-
pear altogether."31
A sign of HBCU economic woes is the disparity in athletic budgets
between HBCUs and other Division I schools. Delaware State Uni-
versity, of the MEAC, had the biggest annual athletic budget of all
tine's, Saint Paul's, Shaw, Virginia State, and Virginia Union. CIAA, http://www.theciaa.com/
landing/index.html (last visited on January 21, 2009).
25. CIAA Tournament is a lot more than basketball, ESPN, Feb. 27, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espn/wire?section=ncb&id=3267370.
26. Id.
27. The Atlantic Coast Conference ("ACC"), a BCS Conference, includes Boston College,
Clemson, Duke, Florida State, Georgia Tech, Maryland, Miami, North Carolina, North Carolina
State, Virginia, Virginia Tech, and Wake Forest. Theacc, Home Page, http://www.theacc.com/
(last visited February 4, 2009).
28. Associated Press, CIAA Tournament, supra note 25. The NCAA Division I tournament is
held each March to conclude the basketball season. 65 teams are invited to the tournament,
including a representative from each of the 31 Division I conferences (usually the postseason
conference tournament champion) and 34 at-large teams selected by a committee. The 16 sec-
ond-round winners qualify for "Regional" competition. NCAA, NCAA Division I Men's
Basketball Championship Information: Championship Structure, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/resources/file/ebf4d445242e708/09ChampStructure.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&attachment
=true (last visited January 21, 2009).
29. Dana O'Neil, HBCUs struggling to survive, ESPN, Feb. 15, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=oneil_dana&id=3232895.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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HBCUs at $17.2 million. 32 This figure pales in comparison with those
at most NCAA Division I schools, ranking 124th out of 339.33
One reason for the decline in the fortunes of HBCU athletics is that
integration of all schools, especially in the south, opened up opportu-
nities to black athletes that were not there before. As more black
athletes (and students) went to formerly all-white schools, HBCU en-
rollment (and athletic success) declined.34 HBCUs are still "a source
of accomplishment and great pride for the African American commu-
nity as well as the entire nation,"35 but they must continue to adapt to
a changing national landscape.
C. Guarantee Games
As noted above, guarantee games are nonconference matches, usu-
ally between high-profile, high-ranking Division I schools from BCS
conferences and low-profile, low-ranking schools from non-BCS con-
ferences. The agreements (or "guarantee contracts") that govern
these games typically stipulate that they are played on the home court
of the "major" school, and stipulate a large payment, or "guarantee"
that the host school contracts to pay the low-ranking visitor. The on-
court result is usually a resounding victory for the hosts: "They call
them guarantee games for a reason. Little school X takes a five-figure
paycheck from Big School Y, travels across the country and loses by
40. The guarantee is for the home squad." 36 Mike Gillespie, former
coach of HBCU Florida A & M (FAMU) has said of the benefits of
guarantee games, "I'm guaranteed a paycheck. [The BCS conference
school is] guaranteed a win."37 Guarantee games have proliferated in
number and increased in prominence over the past several years, as
the guarantee payments associated with them have risen.
The proliferation of guarantee games has been a concern to some
who follow college basketball. Kyle Whelliston, a college basketball
writer and blogger, has analogized guarantee games to fixed boxing
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. White House Initiative, Home Page, supra note 16.
36. Dana O'Neil, Alcorn State facing constant battles as Division I have-not, ESPN, Feb. 14,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=oneil_dana (last visited January 21,
2009).
37. Kyle Whelliston, Palookanomics, The Mid-Majority, Nov, 24, 2004, http://www.midmajor
ity.com/2004/11/palookanomics.php. Whelliston has published stories on ESPN.com in addition
to his blog, The Mid-Majority. An entry entitled, "What We Do" on The Mid-Majority notes
that, "Now in its fifth season, The Mid-Majority is a blog about the 221h smaller Division I
college basketball conferences (and independents) by me, Kyle Whelliston. I write for Basketball
Times, and I maintain and edit Basketball State."
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matches, distinguishing the two solely because "[i]n college basketball,
paying an opponent a large sum of money to take a loss is completely
legal and acceptable behavior. In fact, athletic departments openly
include these payments in their publicly-published budgets!"38
While guarantee games (and guarantee contracts) are an issue of
concern within all of college basketball 39, they are a more pressing
issue to HBCUs. In February, 2008, all but four members of the
MEAC and all members of the SWAC had RPI rankings in the 200s. 4 0
Such teams are attractive opponents to BCS-conference teams look-
ing for easy non-conference home games. Conversely, the prospect of
a large guarantee payment may be difficult to pass up for HBCUs
pressed for cash to fund their athletic budgets: "That's the way of the
world in the MEAC. You bring your overmatched team into a high-
powered program's arena for a five-figure check that helps keep an
entire athletic department afloat." 41 Said Coppin State coach and ath-
letic director Ron "Fang" Mitchell: "That buys a lot of baseballs, golf
balls and uniforms." 42
While providing needed funds for HBCU athletic departments,
guarantee contracting also produces significant non-financial conse-
quences. Continually playing (and losing) by wide margins lowers the
RPI of HBCUs. Since half of the RPI is derived from opponents'
winning percentages 43, the guarantee game blowouts can have a sort
38. Id. Despite his concern, Whelliston concludes that "things work out on balance" because a
BCS-conference school that were to schedule too many guarantee games would suffer in the RPI
rankings (see infra note 40) and risk not being selected for the NCAA tournament. This conclu-
sion is unconvincing due to the sheer number of BCS-conference schools continuing to schedule
guarantee games. As noted infra note 77, BCS-conference schools scheduled 69 games with
HBCUs alone over approximately seven weeks in late 2008 and early 2009, or an average of
almost 10 such games a week.
39. See Whelliston, Smaller schools hit the road for a beatdown-and a paycheck, ESPN, Aug.
6, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?id=3775030.
40. O'Neil, supra note 29. The Ratings Percentage Index, or RPI, is a ranking system em-
ployed by the NCAA to aid the selection committee (see supra note 28) for the NCAA tourna-
ment in selecting teams: "Several independent elements are combined to produce the RPI.
These elements are a part of the statistical information that may or may not be utilized by each
[committee] member in any manner they choose." NCAA, NCAA Division I Men's Basketball
Championship Information: Principles and Procedures, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
resources/file/ebe23c44cbfccf0/09PrinciplesandProcedures.pdfMOD=AJPERES&attachment=
true (last visited January 21, 2009). While the NCAA's description is short on specifics, college
basketball observers, including Jerry Palm, have ascertained the formula and publish RPI rank-
ings during the season. The RPI has become important to schools because it helps determine
whether they make the tournament or not. CollegeRPI, FAQ, http://collegerpi.com/ (last visited
January 21, 2009).
41. Pat Forde, MEAC struggles to gain national respect, ESPN, Feb. 28, 2005, http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=forde-pat&id=2001780.
42. Id.
43. CollegeRPI, supra note 40.
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of geometric effect: HBCUs with already-low RPIs might lower them
further simply by playing their conference opponents who have also
suffered guarantee game blowouts: "The annual series of unwinnable
nonconference games have made the SWAC the nation's lowest-rated
conference in each of the past three seasons."44
Other effects of guarantee games are harder to quantify but may be
just as significant from a policy standpoint. "The losses chip away not
only at the league's RPI but also at its collective psyche." 45 Players
and coaches both feel the effects. Howard University head coach
Butch Beard said: "Those kids suffer tremendously.. .It can take us 2-
3 weeks to get them back to believing they can compete." 46
Grambling head coach Larry Wright stated, "I hate it. I wish we didn't
have to play those games." 4 7 And Alcorn State player Troy Jackson
said, "You just get beat up mentally. . .You start believing, 'Man, we
can't win. We're never going to win a game.' and it carries over into
the conference season. The losing, it just eats at you." 48
Beyond the perhaps-immeasurable psychological harm of system-
atic guarantee contracting, the financial ramifications of a guarantee
game schedule may be more complicated than they initially seem.
"The irony at Alcorn is the basketball team sees hardly any of the
money it brings in. The guaranteed money is put into a general
fund-not a general athletics fund but a general university fund." 4 9
D. Recent Guarantee Game Contracts
The terms of four guarantee game contracts signed in 2007 by
HBCUs with BCS-conference schools or third-party promoters illus-
trate the large payouts available to HBCUs for such games. The con-
tracts signed with BCS-conference host schools generally provide
those schools with significantly greater opportunities for revenue gen-
eration, victories, and developing fan and public goodwill than they
afford the HBCUs. Contracts signed with third-party promoters may
increase the opportunities for victory and goodwill for the HBCUs,
but in exchange for reduced guarantees. Furthermore, these third-
party contracts are even more lucrative for the BCS-conference
schools than for HBCUs.
44. Glockner, supra note 1.
45. Id.
46. Forde, supra note 41.
47. Glockner, supra, note 1.
48. O'Neil, Alcorn State, supra, note 36.
49. Id.
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1. HBCU Guarantee Contracts: "Traditional" Guarantees
Three guarantee contracts entered into by HBCUs in 2007 illustrate
the guaranteed payouts, travel and ticket arrangements typical of
guarantee games. These contracts arranged games played in late 2007
or early 2008, during the "nonconference" phase of the 2007-08 sea-
son. All three contracts committed an HBCU (Florida A & M and
Norfolk State of the MEAC and Jackson State (JSU) of the SWAC) to
play on the home court of a BCS-conference school (The University
of Connecticut (UConn) of the Big East, the University of Nebraska
of the Big 12, and the University of California (Cal) of the Pacific 10).
UConn guaranteed FAMU $77,000 for coming to the northeast to
play a game on November 26, 2007.50 The contract did not require
that FAMU's expenses be taken out of the guarantee. The one-page
contract contains a term specifying ticket arrangements and a force
majeure term.51 (Curiously, for reasons that are unclear, the contract
also prohibited Florida A & M from bringing its band, cheerleaders or
mascot to the game.) 52
Cal guaranteed JSU $65,000 to fly from Mississippi to the Bay Area
to play on December 5, 2007. The contract stipulates that Cal would
pay JSU's "airfare, ground transportation, hotel, and meals" out of
the guarantee.53
Nebraska guaranteed Norfolk State $60,000, "minus ground trans-
portation" and 12 hotel rooms for two nights to play the Cornhuskers
in Lincoln on November 20, 2007.54 However, the contract specified
50. Univ. of Conn., Article of Agreement with Florida A & M University (March 28, 2007)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Article of Agreement]. Obtained pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. Secs. 1-200 to 1-242. FAMU lost the game 93-54. UConnHuskies.com, Adrien, Thabeet
Lead Huskies Over Florida A&M, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.uconnhuskies.com/AllStories/
MBasketball/2007/11/26/20071126.html.
51. Id.
52. Perhaps this was a prudent term for UConn to include. FAMU's marching band, known as
the "Marching 100," is known for its vibrant and theatrical performances at football games, and
is often as much of an attraction as the game itself. Their presence in an indoor basketball arena
might be impressive and intimidating to FAMU's opponent. See FAMU, Marching 100, http://
www.famu.edulindex.cfm?a=marchingl00&p=welcome (last visited January 21, 2009. It is not
clear whether the Marching 100 ever travels to non-conference road basketball games.
53. Univ. of Cal. Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, Athletic Agreement 2007-2008 Ac-
ademic Year (March 1, 2007) para. 3. (on file with author) [hereinafter Athletic Agreement].
Obtained pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code Secs. 6250 to 6276.48. Jackson State lost the game 117-74.
jsutigers.cstv.com, Tigers fall 117-74 to Golden Bears, Dec. 6, 2007, http://jsutigers.cstv.com/
sports/m-baskbl/recaps/120607aaa.html.
54. Univ. of Neb.-Lincoln, Athletic Contract (June 19, 2007) para. 1 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Athletic Contract]. Obtained pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. Secs. 84-712 to 84-712.09.
Norfolk State lost the game 83-48. Nsuspartans.com, Big 2nd Half Lifts Nebraska Over NSU,
Nov. 20, 2007, http://www.nsuspartans.com/news/2007/11/20/MBB_1120071835.aspx?path=mb
ball.
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that $40,000 of the guarantee be paid to "C.I. Travel" and $12,000 to
"Fleet Management" with the rest going to Norfolk State Univer-
sity.55 This may suggest that under some "guarantee" contracts, the
amount of money actually reaching the university may be a relatively
small percentage of the contractual guarantee. Alternatively, it could
suggest that Norfolk State may have negotiated the contract in such a
way as to satisfy obligations to third parties or creditors. Both pos-
sibilities would be consistent with HBCU athletic departments' finan-
cial difficulties.
2. HBCU Guarantee Contracts: Tournaments
A slightly different model of guarantee contracting exists where
universities contract with third-party promoters who set up and run
tournaments. The contract terms for the same event may vary widely
depending on the school. One such third-party promoter is Basketball
Promotions, Inc., (BPI) who ran the Las Vegas Holiday Invitational
tournament from November 18 to November 24, 2007.56 One of the
schools BPI contracted with to play in the tournament was the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), a BCS-conference
school and perennial basketball powerhouse.57 Another school BPI
contracted with was South Carolina State University5 8 (SCSU), an
HBCU and MEAC member. The two schools' contracts with BPI dis-
play widely divergent terms.
In contrast to the "traditional" guarantee contracts discussed above,
SCSU was guaranteed only $30,000 by BPI to participate in the tour-
nament.59 However, the round-robin tournament format provided
that SCSU would play four games. Two games were on the road, in-
cluding one at UNC, and two "final round" games were on a neutral
floor in Las Vegas.60 Terms in the contract stipulate that BPI would
pay all of SCSU's "hotel, bus transportation, and airfare accommoda-
tions" to and from Las Vegas, 61 and provide 50 free tickets to the Las
Vegas games. 62
55. Id.
56. Basketball Promotions Inc., 2007 Las Vegas Invitational University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill Men's Basketball Agreement (May 19, 2007) (on file with author). Obtained pursu-
ant to N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 132-1 to 132-10.
57. Id.
58. Basketball Promotions Inc., 2007 Las Vegas Invitational South Carolina State University
Men's Basketball Agreement (April 18, 2007)(on file with author) [hereinafter North Carolina
Men's Basketball Agreement]. Obtained pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. sec. 30-4-10 to 30-4-165.
59. Id. at para. 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at para. 4.
62. Id. at para. 10.
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While the guarantee may be less than half of the $77,000 Connecti-
cut paid FAMU for a guarantee game, or the $65,000 California paid
JSU, SCSU's travel expenses are not deducted from the guarantee, as
they were for JSU. In addition, because of the inclusion of some other
non-BCS schools in the tournament, there was a greater chance that
they might win a game.63
UNC's terms, however, are even more attractive than SCSU's.
UNC's contract stipulates that it must pay a guarantee to BPI of
$120,000, and that it must pay its own expenses to Las Vegas.64 How-
ever, the contract also stipulates that UNC would be selected to host
two early-round games in the tournament and would be able to keep
all revenues from those games. In addition, UNC was to receive 200
free tickets to the Las Vegas rounds of the tournament. 65
It is somewhat difficult to determine the precise benefit to UNC
from these contract terms without knowing the amount of revenue it
can generate from home basketball games. However, it is a reasona-
ble inference that that revenue, for one of the top teams in the coun-
try, located in a basketball-mad state, would be substantial. The terms
of this contract allow UNC to effectively pay a guarantee of $120,000
for two home games, roughly comparable to the 2007 going price for
two guarantee games, based on the Nebraska and California contracts
discussed above. However, UNC gains a total of four games for that
price instead of two. It is also possible that the excitement of a "tour-
nament" would marginally increase gate revenue for the two home
games.
Contracts with third-party promoters for tournaments may allow
for more attractive terms for both HBCUs and BCS conference
schools than traditional guarantee games. However, the contract
terms available to the two groups of schools remain disparate from
each other.
III. ANALYSIS
The terms of the guarantee contracts provide generous compensa-
tion to HBCUs and may appear to justify HBCUs' systematic regimen
of guarantee contracting. However, players and coaches suggest that
guarantee contracts also engender mental and emotional hardships for
63. SCSU did in fact defeat lona 81-76 in Las Vegas. In their other tournament games, they
were blown out at UNC 110-64 and lost at Old Dominion 64-54 and to Hartford 80-72 in over-
time in Las Vegas. Scsuathletics.com, 2007-2008 SC State MBB Final Statistics, http://www.scsu
athletics.com/ (last visited January 23, 2009).
64. North Carolina Men's Basketball Agreement, supra note 58, at para. 4.
65. Id. at para. 14.
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HBCU personnel. They force student-athletes to spend even more
time away from school than other Division I athletes. Furthermore,
the practice of guarantee game contracting seems to contribute to and
perhaps perpetuate financial difficulties for some HBCU athletic de-
partments. In this context it is reasonable to question whether guar-
antee game contracts may violate contract law by being
unconscionable or void as against public policy in certain situations.
A. Unconscionability
1. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability has two elements: procedural and
substantive. Modern views of procedural unconsionability often in-
volve contracts between, on the one hand, a sophisticated, often cor-
porate party, and on the other hand, an unsophisticated entity or
individual. 66 For example, evidence that would constitute procedural
unconscionability has been said to consist of a lack of understanding
of contract terms arising from fine print, complex legalistic or "boiler-
plate" language, disparity in sophistication or bargaining power of the
parties. Another example of a court's formulation of procedural un-
conscionability is that it addresses whether a party had a reasonable
opportunity to read and understand the terms of the contract.67
Modern discussions of substantive unconscionability have found it
where the terms of the contract are one-sided or overly harsh, which
occurs where the terms are "shocking to the conscience," "mon-
strously harsh," or "exceedingly calloused." 68
In 2002, a federal district court held that a health club chain's em-
ployee arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and therefore un-
enforceable. 69 The court held the agreement was procedurally
unconscionable where the chain's regional human resources director,
an attorney, had given employees insufficient time to review the com-
plicated agreement and threatened employees that if they did not sign
the agreement, they would not be promoted. 70 As a result of these
"high-pressure" tactics, and the disparity in bargaining power between
the parties, the plaintiff employee "reasonably felt she had no choice"
but to sign the agreement.71
66. The classic case is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
67. Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah 1997).
68. Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781 (Wash. 2004).
69. Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F.Supp.2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
70. Id. at 383.
71. Id.
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The court also held the agreement was substantively unconsciona-
ble, where the agreement unreasonably favored the health club
chain.72 The agreement allowed the chain to unilaterally modify the
employee contract at any time, potentially binding employees to a
contract they would have never seen. The agreement denied the
plaintiff employee the right to proceed in court with a pending sexual
harassment claim against the chain.73
2. Are Guarantee Contracts Unconscionable?
It may appear that guarantee contracts inherently involve one
"more powerful party" and one "imposed-upon party;" certainly the
BCS schools are "more powerful" than non-BCS or HBCUs in terms
of financial resources and facilities. These advantages are generally
quantified in the RPI and top 25 rankings74 and reflected in the score
of many guarantee games. Nonetheless, this disparity in power does
not alone appear to constitute unconsionability under the law. In the
context of the modern court discussions of unconscionability, guaran-
tee contracts are likely not unconscionable.
This is because, unlike "imposed-upon" parties to procedurally un-
conscionable contracts, it seems that HBCUs do have "meaningful
choice" as to whether to enter into guarantee contracts. HBCUs ap-
pear to have wide choice with regard to where and when they can play
guarantee games,75 as shown from the large number of different BCS
schools entering into guarantee games with HBCUs in 2008.76
HBCUs also likely have some freedom to negotiate the amount of the
72. Id. at 384.
73. Id.
74. During the basketball season, the Associated Press and ESPN.com/USA Today publish
rankings (based on writers' (AP) or coaches' (ESPN/USA Today) votes) of the Top 25 basket-
ball teams in the nation on a weekly basis. See ESPN, Men's Basketball Rankings, http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncb/rankings (last visited January 22, 2009).
75. Provided, of course, that the game is a road game for the HBCU. Among the 69 games
played between HBCUs and BCS conference members between November 14, 2008 and January
7, 2009, only one was played on the home court of the HBCU. Perhaps not coincidently, the
game resulted in a win for the HBCU: Howard University defeated Oregon State 47-45 in Wash-
ington, D.C. on November 14. Howard-bison.com, Myatt, White Combine To Lead Howard To
Big Win Over Oregon State, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.howard-bison.com/sports/mbkb/2008-09/
news/Myatt-_WhiteCombineToLeadHowardToBigWinOverOregonState (last visited
January 22, 2009).
76. SWAC schools played 28 games against BCS conference opponents in between November
26 and December 31, 2008. MEAC schools played 41 games against BCS conference opponents
between November 14, 2008 and January 7, 2009. See SWAC, SWAC Men's Basketball schedule,
http://www.swac.org/sports/m-baskbl/sched/swac-m-baskbl-sched.html (last visited January 22,
2009), and see MEAC, MEAC 2008-09 Men's Basketball schedules, http://www.meacsports.com/
SportSelect.dbml?DBOEMID=20800&SPID=12094&SPSID=98172 (last visited January 22,
2009).
2009]1 53
54 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 6:41
guarantee and perhaps some other terms.77 In addition, none of the
contracts examined above appear to contain fine print or boilerplate
or legalistic language. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be said that
an HBCU or other non-BCS school is "unsophisticated," where the
institution enters into numerous game contracts in numerous sports
each year and employs a general counsel among many other athletic
and university administrators.
With regard to substantive unconsionability, it may first appear that
terms of guarantee contracts are "unreasonably favorable to the more
powerful party," where the non-BCS school must go on the road to
play, often multiple times in short succession and often suffers blow-
out losses. However, it is doubtful that the requirement of a road
game alone would rise to the level of a term that would "impair the
integrity of the bargaining process."
Furthermore, non-BCS and HBCUs receive generous payouts in
exchange for going on the road for a blowout loss. Neither the road
requirement nor the size of the payout would suggest a contract that is
"shocking to the conscience," "monstrously harsh," and "exceedingly
calloused." Thus guarantee contracts in their present form are likely
not unconscionable.
B. Possible Unconscionability of Cancellation Terms
Some other common NCAA athletic contracts, such as scholarships
and the national letters of intent (NLI)78 , may be unconscionable.
While such contracts are distinguishable from guarantee game con-
tracts, they help to explain which specific terms of guarantee contracts
are legally problematic.
77. According to Whelliston, "The little guys are getting good at the game, too - they know
that big schools need to fill up their early-season schedules . . .and this drives the scheduling
process into the summer and the prices into the stratosphere. 'I'm just amazed at how it goes
into September because guys hold out for something more,' says Notre Dame associate head
coach Sean Kearney." Whelliston, supra note 37. Neither Kearney nor Whelliston was discuss-
ing HBCUs in particular, however.
78. "The NLI is a voluntary program with regard to both institutions and student-athletes ...
By signing a National Letter of Intent, a prospective student-athlete agrees to attend the desig-
nated college or university for one academic year. Pursuant to the terms of the National Letter
of Intent program, participating institutions agree to provide athletics financial aid for one aca-
demic year to the student-athlete, provided he/she is admitted to the institution and is eligible
for financial aid under NCAA rules. An important provision of the National Letter of Intent
program is a recruiting prohibition applied after a prospective student-athlete signs a Letter of
Intent. This prohibition requires participating institutions to cease recruitment of a prospective
student-athlete once a National Letter of Intent is signed with another institution." NCAA,
About the National Letter of Intent, http://www.ncaa.orglwps/portal/nli (last visited January 23,
2009).
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NCAA student-athletes preparing to receive NCAA athletic schol-
arships must execute the NLI and their university's statement of fi-
nancial aid. These agreements may be unconscionable. 7 9 Both the
NLI and financial aid statements are "standardized-form adhesion
contracts"8 0 that may be "viewed as oppressive by the courts because
of the gross inequality of bargaining power between the two par-
ties."8 There also is the element of surprise present in both docu-
ments due to their incorporation by reference of NCAA legislation,
essentially concealing the terms of the contract to the young student-
athlete.8 2
While guarantee contracts may be standardized to a certain extent
(a reasonable expectation for schools that enter into numerous ath-
letic contracts each year), and are prepared by the BCS-conference
host or the third-party promoter, none of the guarantee contracts dis-
cussed above contains fine print or would be difficult to read for the
reasonably educated person. In addition, the contracting schools can-
not reasonably be viewed as disproportionately unsophisticated in the
same way as the young athletes signing the NLI and financial aid
statement.
However, some guarantee contracts are analogous to athletic schol-
arships in terms of the lack of freedom to cancel the contract and find
alternative opportunities. The NLI and financial aid statements may
be substantively unconscionable due to NCAA rules that allow
schools to revoke scholarships without cause but prohibit an athlete
from receiving a scholarship elsewhere unless he83 obtains permission
from the current institution.84
Guarantee contracts' cancellation terms widely vary. For example,
Connecticut's contract with FAMU provides that in the event of a
breach, the breaching party is required to pay the non-breaching party
$77,000, the amount of the guarantee.8 5  California's contract with
JSU contains a more detailed term, stipulating that in the event of a
breach the breaching party pay the non-breaching party $50,000, less
79. "[T]he combination of oppression and unfair surprise directed towards student-athletes
leaves no doubt that athletic scholarship contracts are procedurally unconscionable. . . . the
terms and provisions . . . are unreasonably favorable to the NCAA and its member institutions,
[constituting] substantive unconscionability. Therefore, athletic scholarship contracts are uncon-
scionable contracts of adhesion Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Con-
tracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAw. J. 41, 74 (2006).
80. Id. at 70.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 71.
83. The prohibition applies to all NCAA athletes of both genders.
84. Id. at 72.
85. Article of Agreement, supra note 50.
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than the guarantee of $65,000.86 The term defines this amount as "a
reasonable estimate of the actual damages that would be suffered"
and that it represents "liquidated damages and not a penalty."87
By contrast, however, Nebraska's contract with Norfolk State con-
tains two terms related to cancellation. The first provides that Nor-
folk State pay the amount of the guarantee ($60,000) to Nebraska "for
cancellation of this scheduled event."88 Such a term apparently con-
templates a unilateral cancellation by Norfolk State, and the contract
contains no similar term providing for damages in the event that Ne-
braska were to cancel the game. The inclusion of a harsh cancellation
term for the non-BCS school, combined with the lack of a cancellation
term for the BCS school, would appear to be analogous to Hanlon's
description of the substantive unconscionability of NCAA scholarship
contracts. It would appear to constrain the non-BCS school to playing
the game, once the contract is executed, while the BCS school re-
mained free to "shop around" for other opponents (perhaps those
that would accept a lower guarantee).
However, immediately following the cancellation term in the Ne-
braska-Norfolk State contract is a term stipulating that "[t]he contest
can only be cancelled or rescheduled by mutual agreement of both
institutions." 89 This term would appear to be in conflict with the pre-
vious term to the extent that Nebraska would not be able to unilater-
ally cancel the game without agreeing with Norfolk State to do so.
While the contract does not provide for a remedy for Norfolk State in
that event, presumably Norfolk State would be free to sue for the
amount of the contract or for specific performance (forcing Nebraska
to honor the contract and play the game).
Such varying cancellation terms suggest that some guarantee con-
tracts may contain substantive terms that may be unfair in the manner
of scholarship contracts. As noted above, however, guarantee con-
tracts are not procedurally unconscionable in a way analogous to
scholarship contracts, which would likely leave any finding of substan-
tive accountability alone insufficient for a final finding of
unconscionability.
C. Contracts Void as Against Public Policy
While the harsh terms of guarantee game contracts likely do not
rise to the level of unconsicionability, some of those terms may be
86. Athletic Agreement, supra note 53. at para. 6.
87. Id.
88. Athletic Contract, supra note 54, at para. 3.
89. Id. at para. 4.
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contrary to public policy. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts de-
clares that a contract is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if
legislation so provides or if "the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstance by a public policy against the enforce-
ment of such terms."90 Thus, a determination as to whether a contact
is unenforceable due to public policy is a case-by-case determination
that requires an examination of the facts of the particular situation
and public policy interests relevant to that situation.
The Restatement lists a number of factors that should be taken into
account in "weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term . ..
these include:
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular
term.9'
In addition, "in weighing a public policy against enforcement of a
term, account is taken of:
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that
policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and
the term." 92
In attempting to apply this balancing test in the context of guaran-
tee contracts, it is important to first note that there are strong interests
in favor of enforcement of a contract bargained for between two uni-
versities. Both parties would likely have justified expectations that
the contract would be enforced, and if enforcement were denied, each
party would forfeit something of significant value: a guaranteed pay-
ment or a home game with significant revenue.
D. Public Policies Against Enforcement of Guarantee Contracts
Relevant public policies that might weigh against enforcement of a
HBCU guarantee contract term include the federal government's rec-
ognition of HBCUs, students' contractual relationship with universi-
ties and students' standing as third-party beneficiaries to contracts
between the NCAA and universities. Also weighing against the en-
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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forcement of such contracts are universities' possible duties to educate
their students and deal with them in good faith.
However, courts have been hostile to student claims brought
against the NCAA and member universities. Even if relevant public
policies weigh against enforcement of guarantee contracts, they might
not be overcome by judicial recognition of the universities' interests in
and expectation of the contracts' enforcement.
1. White House Recognition of HBCUs
The official policy of the executive branch is that HBCUs' educa-
tional mission, institutional stability and financial health should be
supported and sustained. Each President since Jimmy Carter has
signed an executive order establishing or furthering programs specifi-
cally charged with supporting HBCUs. 9 3 On September 15, 1981,
President Ronald Reagan signed an executive order establishing the
White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universi-
ties. 9 4 The most recent Executive Order relating to HBCUs was
signed by President George W. Bush on February 12, 2002.95 The or-
der was issued, in part, to ". . .strengthen the capacity of historically
black colleges and universities to provide the highest quality educa-
tion. ."96 The order created an advisory committee in the Office of
the Secretary of Education and charged it with creating an annual re-
port.9 7 Guidelines for the report include the stipulation that, "Particu-
lar emphasis should also be given. . .to enhancing institutional
planning and development, strengthening fiscal stability and financial
management, and improving institutional infrastructure. . .to ensure
the long-term viability and enhancement of these institutions." 9 8
The actions of Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush have established a strong public policy
in favor of sound financial management, institutional health and ulti-
mately, the preservation of HBCUs. This articulated public policy
would seem to favor avoidance of arrangements such as guarantee
contracts that might create unhealthy financial dependencies, limit the
quality of education for student-athletes, and engender emotional or
psychological hardship for staff and student-athletes.
93. List, supra note 15. As of September 3, 2009, President Obama had not yet signed such an
order.
94. Exec. Order No. 12,320, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,107 (September 15, 1981).
95. Exec. Order No. 13,256, 67 Fed. Reg. 6,823 (February 12, 2002).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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2. A University's Contractual Relationship With a Student
A university's system of guarantee contracting could violate public
policy if it caused the university to breach its contractual relationship
with its student-athletes. 99 The student-university relationship is es-
sentially contractual in nature, and the terms of the contract may in-
clude statements in publications disseminated by the university or
provided to the student. 0 0 Students may sue universities for a breach
of this contract. 01 However, courts have generally held that students
must allege the breach of very specific and objectively verifiable
promises to state a cause of action.102
One of the only cases to allow a suit to go forward alleging less
specific promises made by a university involved a college basketball
player. In Ross v. Creighton University, the Seventh Circuit allowed a
former Creighton University basketball player's breach of contract
lawsuit to go forward despite the fact that the promises the player
alleged the university made to him "were neither particularly specific
or capable of objective measurement."10 3 The court read the com-
plaint to allege that the university had made the promise "' . . . that he
would be able to participate in a meaningful way in that [basketball]
program because it would provide certain specific services to him.' "104
Guarantee contracts could be challenged by a student-athlete who
alleges that a university's guarantee contracting practices violate the
university's contractual relationship with the athlete. Under the usual
standard, the athlete would have to allege the breach of specific
promises, which might only happen if the coach or athletic representa-
tive had explicitly said, "We won't play any guarantee games while
you're here," or something substantially similar. This is unlikely be-
cause schools with a policy of scheduling guarantee games often warn
players of exactly what they're getting into. Alcorn State assistant
coach Jason Cable has said, "We tell guys when they sign [a letter of
intent] 'Sign at your own risk." 105
99. While the eleventh amendment to the Constitution may bar some contract suits against
state universities due to state immunity, in other situations private and public universities may be
similarly situated. 46 A.L.R. 5th 581 (1997).
100. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges and Universities § 25
101. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges and Universities § 45
102. Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University's Implied Obligations of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183, 204 (2000), (citing Ross v. Creighton Univer-
sity, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992)).
103. Id. at 211.
104. Id. (quoting Ross, 957 F.2d at 417).
105. O'Neil, Alcorn State, supra note 38.
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Under a more relaxed Ross standard, a student-athlete might be
able to bring a suit for breach of a vaguer promise. For instance, an
athlete could allege that he had been led to believe that he would have
adequate time and conditions to study, a promise breached by numer-
ous road guarantee games with substandard travel and accommoda-
tions. Or an athlete could allege that he was promised an
environment in which his basketball skills would improve, a promise
breached by numerous games against far-superior opponents that pro-
vide little opportunity for execution and skill practice. Such suits
might be foreclosed by the disclaimers HBCU coaches offer recruits:
"You need to recruit kids that are capable of playing that kind of a
[guarantee game] schedule and kids that want to play that kind of
schedule," said UAPB coach George Ivory. 106 Nonetheless, the con-
tractual nature of the student-university relationship is important in
understanding the limits public policy interests might place on
HBCUs' contracting policies.
3. A University's Duty to Educate and the Student as Third-Party
Beneficiary
Courts have recognized the existence of a special relationship be-
tween athletes and universities.1 0 7 In Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Col-
lege, the Third Circuit found that the school's active recruitment of a
student-athlete created a special relationship between the parties, that
the relationship in turn required that the university provide a special
standard of care to student-athletes, and that such a duty's financial
and administrative costs did not outweigh the public policy of protect-
ing athletes.108 In addition, the Colorado court of Appeals' decision
in Bloom v. NCAA recognized that student-athletes have standing to
sue the NCAA as third-party beneficiaries to the contract between the
NCAA and its member institutions. 109 In Bloom, a Colorado football
player and world-class skier sued the NCAA to enjoin it from prohib-
iting him from playing football while receiving endorsement money
related to his professional skiing. 10
106. Crise, supra note 4.
107. Harold B. Hilborn, Student-Athletes and Judicial Inconsistency: Establishing a Duty to
Educate as a Means of Fostering Meaningful Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 89 Nw. U. L.
REv. 741, 767 (1995).
108. Id. at 768.
109. Joel Eckert, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59
VAND. L.J. 905, 907 (2006).
110. Id.
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Courts' recognition of this duty and standing may make it easier for
athletes to sue the NCAA itself for institutions' (or institutional per-
sonnel's) violation of NCAA regulations or bylaws."1
Congress has also recognized the special relationship between ath-
letes and universities by the requirement that universities disclose cer-
tain information about student athletes to the Department of
Education.112
Guarantee contracts that demand significant time away from study
without a compelling educational purpose could perhaps rise to the
level of violating a university's duty to educate a student. Even if one
individual guarantee contract might not constitute such a violation,
perhaps a policy of numerous guarantee contracts may. If the purpose
of such contracts is fundamentally pecuniary gain, this also may call
into question whether a university is adequately "protecting" a stu-
dent and instead prioritizing financial concerns. Athletes could also
allege that a systematic policy of scheduling guarantee contracts, with
its repeated blowouts, long trips, and substandard accommodations
breaches a university's duty to "protect" athletes' physical and psy-
chological health. Such student arguments at HBCUs might likely be
foreclosed by universities' insistence that they prepared the student-
athletes for what they were getting into. Furthermore, Kleinknecht is
distinguishable from a guarantee game scheduling situation because it
concerned a fatality. The athlete in Kleinknecht was a lacrosse player
who died after suffering cardiac arrest at a practice where no trainers
were present, supervised by two coaches who had never discussed
emergency procedures. Furthermore, the nearest telephone was 300
yards away behind an eight-foot cyclone fence. "3
4. Judicial Responses and Standard of Review
These public policies may not call into question the enforceability
or prudence of guarantee contracts in any case. However, judicial re-
sponses to litigation against the NCAA and member institutions sug-
gest that any claims based on such duties or policies may be unlikely
to succeed in the courts.
Courts have historically deferred to the NCAA and universities in
cases involving student athletes.114 Courts have historically been re-
luctant to interfere in NCAA dealings because the NCAA is a volun-
tary association, and have generally intervened only when the
111. Id. at 928-9.
112. Id.
113. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1363 (3rd Circuit 1993).
114. Eckert, supra note 109, at 913.
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NCAA's actions have been found to be arbitrary and capricious.
Some courts have applied the even more lenient standard of bad
faith.1 '
This deferential standard of review applied to individual colleges
and universities is analogous to the Business Judgment Rule that
courts apply to corporate boards of directors. The Business Judgment
Rule presumes that directors act in good faith and in the best interests
of the company. 116 However, "university officials who make decisions
regarding the welfare of these athletes (coaches, athletic directors,
faculty members, or high level officials) face inherent conflicts of in-
terest."117 "[Tihe staggering sums of money at stake in Division I bas-
ketball and football may shift the priorities of university officials from
acting in the best interests of their respective schools."118
However, this deferential standard could be disregarded in favor of
a stricter one that would be more appropriate to the circumstances of
student athletes.119 Under the stricter formulation, basketball and
football players at Division I schools pursuing breach of contract
claims against the university or the NCAA could argue that their per-
formances generate revenues that create these conflicts of interest.120
Athletes would likely need to show that the alleged harmful actions of
the university "sprang directly from the conflict between the univer-
sity's financial welfare and the welfare of the athlete."121
HBCU athletic departments enter into guarantee contracts pre-
cisely because of the critical state of department finances. In this way,
the "harmful action" of engaging in a guarantee contract policy does
"spring directly" from the conflict between the university's financial
welfare and the welfare of the athlete. A basketball player on a team
playing guarantee games, especially those requiring long flights,
missed class and spartan conditions, endures these trials precisely be-
cause of an institution's stressed financial posture. The only tangible
benefit is financial, and the benefit may not be enough to justify the
cost. Such an athlete may have an opportunity for a remedy, but the
appropriate one may be monetary damages, not the cancellation of
game contracts, guarantee or otherwise.122 In the absence of the
adoption of the stricter standard, however, courts may continue to
115. Id. at 913-4.
116. Id. at 915.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 916.
119. Id. at 917.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 933-4
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show reluctance to invalidate student-athlete contract claims against
universities.
5. The "Public Service" Exception
At least one other area of contract law may provide persuasive au-
thority for the proposition that a system of guarantee contracting vio-
lates public policy, at least at state universities.12 3 The West Virginia
Supreme Court has held that a university owes a duty of care to ath-
letes on university athletic teams when it encourages them to partici-
pate in any sport.124 The court held that a contract (a release form)
signed by the plaintiff, a club rugby player, was void as a matter of
public policy.125
The underlying law and the court's application of it, while currently
narrowly applicable to anticipatory releases, provides persuasive au-
thority that could be applied to protect student-athlete rights under a
system of guarantee contracting at a state university. The court de-
clared the release in question invalid under a contract law doctrine
that declares unenforceable any contract clause that exempts from
tort liability a party "charged with a duty of public service."l 26
The court concluded that this "public service" exception applied to
West Virginia University. 127 The court reasoned that
When a university provides recreational activities to its students, it
fulfills its educational mission, and performs a public service. As an
enterprise charged with a duty of public service . . . the University
owes a duty of care to its students when it encourages them to par-
ticipate in any sport.128
Application of this contract law doctrine to invalidate a system of
guarantee contracting would require an expansion of the law and is
probably beyond what courts are currently willing to do, even in situa-
tions involving a state university. Nonetheless, the court's analysis of
the "public service" exception is noteworthy in that it (1) recognizes a
state university's duty to perform its public service of educating its
students; (2) recognizes that student athletics are an aspect of that
public service; (3) recognizes that universities that encourage student
123. 40 of the 90 4-year HBCUs are public institutions. List, supra note 15.
124. Kyriazis v. University of West Virginia, 450 S.E.2d 649, 655 (W.V. 1994). (While the
name of the institution involved is officially West Virginia University (See West Virginia Univer-
sity, The History of WVU, http://wvuhistory.wvu.edulhistoryofwvu (last visited September 17,
2009)), the caption of the case lists the defendant as "University of West Virginia").
125. Id.
126. Id. at 653-4 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(b)-(c) (1979).
127. Id. at 655. See note 124, supra.
128. Id.
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participation assume responsibilities toward the students; and (4) rec-
ognizes students' right not to be bound by contracts that purport to
absolve universities from fulfilling those responsibilities. While un-
likely in the near future, courts may eventually apply such analysis to
invalidate institutionalized practices, like guarantee contracting, that
compromise a state university's mission of education to the student-
athlete in conflict with public policy.
E. Alternate Forms of Contracting: Examination of HBCU Football
Contracts and the Big Apple Classic
In the absence of widespread recognition of university duties or
public policies that would cancel or discourage basketball guarantee
contracts, universities and especially HBCUs, may need to consider
alternate models of contracting to ameliorate the financial, emotional
and psychological strain caused by the current system. Two possible
models of contracting already exist: the "Classic" model utilized by
HBCU football programs, and a modest but innovative attempt to ex-
pand the "Classic" model to basketball through the "Big Apple
Classic."
1. Football Contracts: The Circle City Classic
A unique element of HBCU athletic culture is the "Classic," an an-
nual matchup between two HBCU football squads, often held in a
neutral, sometimes northern city and featuring musical and black cul-
tural programming in addition to the game. In 2006 there were 41
such classics, headlined by the most famous one, the Bayou Classic
featuring Grambling State University and Southern University, played
in New Orleans' Superdome. 129
Some classics have evolved into four- and five-day events featuring
golf tournaments, parades, concerts and job fairs. 130 Classics have be-
come, along with guarantee games, the major funding sources for
many HBCU athletic departments.131 According to Southern athletic
director Greg LaFleur, "It's a huge asset to our department.. .There's
no other way you can generate that kind of revenue."l 32 The Bayou
Classic alone provides a third of Southern's athletic budget.133
129. Add Seymour, Jr., Pigskin Payday, DIVERSE, Dec. 28, 2006, at 37-39 (Academic Search
Premier).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Classics provide several advantages over guarantee games, includ-
ing that they are played every year, in large cities, and against tradi-
tional rivals.134 Furthermore, Grambling athletic director Troy
Mathieu noted, Classics serve other purposes besides revenue genera-
tion: "[They] take[ ] our universities into other parts of the country
and serves as a recruiting tool for not only athletics, but our universi-
ties as a whole."135
In October, 2007 FAMU's football team took on fellow HBCU
Winston-Salem State University (WSSU) in the Circle City Classic in
Indianapolis, Indiana. The contract FAMU executed for the Classic
could be adapted to serve as a model for HBCUs in developing a
whole new mode of contracting for Men's basketball.
FAMU's Circle City Classic contract contrasts with the typical
Men's basketball contract in that it is sixteen pages long rather than
one or two pages. The other party to the contract is not WSSU, but a
third party, an established Indiana not-for-profit corporation, Indiana
Black Expo, Inc. (Expo).136 As its name suggests, Expo's contract
with FAMU concerned not merely the football game but also various
related black-cultural themed events held in conjunction with the
game that celebrated HBCU and black culture, likely helping attract
attendance and enhancing attendees attachment and goodwill to the
participating universities. 3 7
134. Id.
135. A troubling note was sounded about Grambling's relationship to the Bayou Classic in a
2002 review conducted by the Louisiana State University System: "[Olne of the most confusing
topics at Grambling is the financial structure of the annual Bayou Classic, where Grambling's
financial participation appears to be exercised via its alumni organization . . . we have great
misgivings about the current structure and believe that it should be the University, and not its
alumni association, which plans, operates and controls Grambling's participation in the Bayou
Classic . .. it is recommended that the University have ultimate control of the revenues and
expenses. The President must be accountable and knowledgeable about these expenditures so as
to ensure that the University and its students are reaping the maximum benefit." The document
noted that the university administration was taking steps to make these financial arrangements
more "open". Grambling State University Review October-December 2002 24, http://www.ulsys
tem.net/assets/docs/searchable/news/2003/grambling-review.pdf (last visited January 23, 2009).
Pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Law, the author made several requests to Grambling
for the 2007 Bayou Classic contract, without success.
136. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Game and Parade Contract, (March 26,
2007)(on file with author) [hereinafter Game and Parade Contract]. Obtained pursuant to Fla.
Stat. Ann. Secs. 119.01 to 119.19. FAMU lost the game, 27-23. Wssurams.cstv.com, Rams Hold
On for 27-23 Win Over Florida A&M in Circle City Classic, Oct. 6, 2007, http://wssurams.cstv.
com/sports/m-footbl/recaps/100607aab.html.
137. Expo's 2007 Annual Report noted: "Continuing to focus the weekend's events on the
support IBE gives to education, the Indiana Black Expo,Inc.ICircle City Scholarship program
awarded more than $100,000 in scholarships at the Classic Scholarship Reception . . . 2007 also
marked the crowning of another Miss Circle City Classic at the Classic Coronation . . . Over 300
youth participated in the Classic's youth football and cheerleading clinic held at the Indianapolis
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The feeling inspired by such a positive and wide-ranging cultural
celebration contrasts with the sentiments likely engendered by a
sparsely attended weeknight blowout basketball loss suffered in a
road venue. If alumni even know about such an event, their reaction
may likely be shame, or at least disappointment.
The "Circle City" contract provides for a guarantee fee of $150,000
to FAMU, plus "reasonable and necessary" expenses.' 38 This guaran-
tee is significantly larger than even the largest guarantees HBCU
Men's basketball teams can command from BCS-conference foes. As
noted above, Men's basketball contracts also typically provide that the
team's expenses be paid out of the guarantee, both lowering the take-
home amount and incentivizing HBCUs to scrimp on expenses to the
discomfort and inconvenience of the student-athletes.
The contract also provides for a $25,000 bonus to FAMU if attend-
ance at the game exceeds 57,000.139 This not only provides an oppor-
tunity for the school to make more money, but it incentivizes the
school to market the game and encourage student, fan and alumni
attendance. In addition, it provides the kind of opportunity that is
absent from most Men's basketball guarantee contracts: a measure of
investment in the event that the school can utilize to its advantage.
2. A Basketball Application: The Big Apple Classic
Since 2006, the Big Apple Classic (BAC) has attempted to apply
some of the principles of HBCU "Classic" football contracting model
to basketball. The 2008 BAC, held on December 6 in New York's
Madison Square Garden, featured a basketball doubleheader with
games between CIAA members Virginia Union and Bowie State and
MEAC members Howard and Hampton.140 Prior to the
doubleheader were a college fair, a drumline competition, exhibitions,
a D.J., food and bands.141
While the programming of the BAC echoes the all-encompassing
cultural focus of the Classics, the contract terms for the event reveal a
Colts Complex." Indiana Black Expo, Inc., Annual Report 2007, http://www.indianablackexpo.
com/pdfs/IBE07-WEB.pdf (last visited January 24, 2009).
138. Game and Parade Contract, supra note 136, at para. 2.01.
139. Id. at para. 2.06.
140. Big Apple Classic, Schedule, http://www.thebigappleclassic.com/ (last visited January 24,
2009). Bowie State lost the game, 52-51. Bsubulldogs.com, Late Free Throw Lifts Virginia Union
to 52-51 Big Apple Classic Win Over Bowie State, Dec. 6, 2008, http://www.bsubulldogs.com/
news/2008/12/6/MBB_1206080907.aspx. Hampton defeated Howard 45-39 in the other game.
Howard-bison.com, Poor Free Throw Shooting Costs Bison, Dec. 6, 2008, http://www.howard-
bison.com/sports/mbkb/2008-09/news/PoorFreeThrowShootingCostsBison.
141. Big Apple Classic, Schedule, http://www.thebigappleclassic.com/ (last visited January 24,
2009).
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contrast to both the Classics and guarantee games. First of all, Bowie
State's contract with the third-party promoter, Johnson, Inc., (John-
son) executed in 2006; committed the school for six years of annual
games.142 This is an unusually long duration for a basketball contract,
which is usually for one year, and occasionally for two or three. Sec-
ond, the contract provides for only a modest annual guarantee, start-
ing at $5000 and gradually increasing to $12,500 by the sixth year of
the contract.143 While Bowie State is a Division II school, and may
not be able to command the guarantee amounts that Division I
schools could, this amount is far below the guarantee amounts pro-
vided for in the other HBCU guarantee contracts examined. Third,
the contract stipulates that this amount be earmarked specifically for a
Men's basketball scholarship at Bowie State, 144 So it may not be put
toward funding other expenses in the athletic department like the
funds harvested from guarantee games and the Classics. The contract
further provides that Johnson pay for Bowie's transportation from
Maryland to New York (albeit by bus), its lodging and a team meal.145
These terms may reveal more than anything else that the market is
untested as to this type of event. The gradually increasing amounts of
the scholarship payment perhaps suggest that the parties contem-
plated that the event would increase in popularity and therefore eco-
nomic benefit. Furthermore, the funding of a basketball scholarship is
an important expense for any athletic department, and for a Division
II school may be even more important. It is also in keeping with the
holistic spirit of the Classics in that it emphasizes the providing of an
education rather than merely moneymaking. If the BAC proves to be
a success, this model of contracting may be more attractive to HBCU
basketball programs in the future.
IV. PROPOSAL
Whether their current guarantee contracts violate contract law,
HBCUs (and perhaps other NCAA institutions) would be better
served by adopting Men's basketball contracting strategies similar to
those of HBCU football games. HBCU basketball teams could high-
light destination events celebrating African-American traditions and
142. Agreement by and between Johnson Inc. and Bowie State University, (March, 2006)
para. 1 (on file with author). Obtained pursuant to Md. State Gov't Code Ann Secs. 10-611 to
10-628.
143. Id. at para. 4.
144. Id.
145. Id. at paras. 6, 7, and 8.
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culture, rather than playing guarantee games away to major Division I
foes and losing by wide margins.
The new model of contracting could not only follow the football
Classic example, but could also incorporate features of the third-party
tournament promoter contracts some HBCUs already utilize. Such
arrangements, like those of the Las Vegas Invitational discussed
above, provide for the host school to pay a large fee, usually about the
same or larger than it would otherwise pay as a guarantee fee, to the
promoter in exchange for the promoter inviting all the other teams,
paying their guarantees, and paying the expenses. The host school
then gets to keep whatever revenue it earns from the games, less the
fee to the promoter. (See discussion above at II(D)(3)). Currently
many of these tournament games are hosted by BCS-conference
schools-those with whom the HBCUs might otherwise sign guaran-
tee contracts-rather than HBCUs themselves.
HBCUs could instead set up their own tournament. Ideally, such a
tournament could be known as the HBCU Invitational, but informally
known as "The Black National Championship." It could involve all
HBCUs playing college basketball, from Divisions I, II and III. The
tournament could replace some or all of the guarantee games HBCUs
currently play during November and December. Scheduling during
this period would avoid conflicts with conference games. Also, No-
vember and December are traditionally the nonconference portion of
the season when many "holiday" tournaments, such as the Las Vegas
Invitational are scheduled. The tournament format could be modeled
on that of the NCAA tournament, with "pods" of four or eight teams
each playing an elimination mini-tournament over a weekend at a
neutral site, with the winners moving on to a Regional tournament at
another site. These sites could be located across the South, in the
states where HBCUs predominate,146 with the occasional site in a
northern city with a large HBCU alumni base or black fan base. This
aspect of the plan follows directly from the "Classics." Black National
Championship games could even be held on the same weekend (but
not the same dates) as some of the "Classic" games; the basketball
games could be held on the Friday and Sunday while the football
game would remain the centerpiece of the weekend on the Saturday.
Tournament games could incorporate the type of cultural celebration
that the football games currently include, such as performances by the
HBCUs' famous bands. Ideally, schools could generate more revenue
146. Seventy-six of the 90 4-year HBCUs are located in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, or Virginia.
See List, supra note 15.
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and more goodwill from this plan than they do from even the large
guarantee contracts they currently sign. However, perhaps the biggest
benefit to HBCUs would be the elimination of the long roadtrips,
blowout losses, inconvenience to athletes and demoralization that
characterize the current guarantee game situation.
Schools' contracts for the tournament would be structured as hy-
brids of the "Classic" model, the Las Vegas Invitational model and the
Big Apple Classic model, with some new terms. Like the "Classics,"
the contracts would stipulate musical and cultural programming and
obligations for the participating schools. This would be necessary to
establish the tournament as a black cultural destination and engender
investment by the schools in the event. Like the Las Vegas Invita-
tional, the contracts could identify certain HBCUs as host schools and
stipulate different ticket, fee and transportation arrangements de-
pending on whether the contracting school was a host. Like the Big
Apple Classic, the contracts could specify that some or all of the guar-
antee money could be earmarked for scholarships, and the contracts
could commit the schools to multiple-year participation in the
tournament.
The tournament contracts would need to include new terms in order
to make the event viable. Most importantly, in order to make partici-
pation worthwhile for all schools, the guarantee money would have to
be shared in some way, so that a school losing in the first round would
not receive so little money to make a guarantee game with a BCS-
conference school more attractive. A certain percentage of all pro-
ceeds could be pooled for the benefit of all participating schools, with
the remainder awarded to the individual schools based on how far
they proceeded through the tournament. Alternatively, the tourna-
ment could include a "loser's bracket" that would guarantee each
team at least two games.
The "HBCU Invitational" tournament plan is not a panacea, of
course. Football is king in the fall at many HBCUs, and the Black
National Championship might not draw large crowds if fans' attention
remained on football. Alternatively, if its games are well-attended,
the basketball tournament could detract from attendance at the Clas-
sics. Furthermore, the schools may be perceived by some observers as
improperly segregating themselves from the college basketball main-
stream by spurning college basketball's best to play only other black
schools in an exclusive tournament. With regard to the financial ar-
rangements, the distribution of funds could prove to be unworkable,
with winning schools balking at sharing money with losers, or "loser's
bracket" games drawing few fans and dragging down prestige.
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These are real arguments which must be weighed against the cur-
rent scheme of large financial guarantees accompanied by blowouts,
long trips and demoralization. However, the tournament proposal has
the potential to develop into a new event that can stand on its own,
neither impacting nor being impacted by the football games. First of
all, the tournament model would employ the exciting elimination for-
mat of the NCAA tournament. This could be enhanced by the inclu-
sion of Division II and III schools, which along with their fans will be
excited for the chance to knock off a Division I school. 14 7 Second, it
will crown a single champion, something the Classics - for all their
cultural value, pomp, and celebration - do not do. It will bring a new
and unique prestige to the schools who win, or even those who make
"The Black Final Four." Third, there may be a group of fans who
would not attend the Classics who would attend the tournament. Bas-
ketball games are shorter than football games, and basketball is
played indoors, out of the elements. Basketball is also arguably more
popular among young people than football, especially as a spectator
sport. Fourth, the games could be scheduled to least conflict with
football-at night, for instance-and in cities with large HBCU
alumni or Black populations that do not currently host a Classic. The
tournament might have initial difficulties attracting attendance, but af-
ter it gets off the ground it has the potential to truly grow into an
eagerly-anticipated annual highlight of the collegiate sports calendar.
It certainly is possible that the tournament model would not make
as much money for the HBCUs as the current guarantee games do.
However, a tournament based on this proposal has potential to be
much more of a destination "event" than guarantee games ever could
be. HBCU fans' attendance at dozens of football "Classics" each year
shows there is a lucrative market for HBCU athletics when paired
with cultural programming at a neutral location and marketed by a
knowledgeable and culturally aware promoter. Entrepreneurs with a
sense of community awareness and appreciation for Black history and
HBCU sports could be recruited to set up third-party entities that
could contract with the schools to host tournament games. Such en-
trepreneurs could demonstrate their commitment to the local commu-
nity and to African American culture by promoting a weekend of
tournament games. Teams would play before enthusiastic crowds of
alumni and local supporters. Schools could gain scholarships and
147. An example of a competition that generates this type of excitement is English Soccer's
FA Cup, whose annual matches between lower- and upper- division teams annually engender
excitement often described as "magic." See SoccerNews, FA Cup magic this weekend, Dec. 28,
2008, http://www.soccernews.com/fa-cup-magic-this-weekend/10996/.
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some money for operating costs. There would be no more discourag-
ing road blowouts, no games with only hostile fans, and no long road-
trips away from school.
Careful economic studies would have to be done to gauge pricing
and potential attendance. However, the current situation may be
about as worse as it can get for HBCUs. The systematically scheduled
slates of guarantee-game blowout losses far from home do little good
for the schools' images or the players' confidence, and not much bet-
ter for the athletic departments' bottom lines. They arguably threaten
schools' responsibility to their students. If a tournament only breaks
even, the benefit to HBCUs would be tremendous based on the gain
to HBCUs image, educational mission, and goodwill.
V. CONCLUSION
Men's basketball guarantee contracts create repeated, demoralizing
blowout losses for teams and arduous road trips away from classes for
players and coaches. Reliance on guarantee contracts assures funding
for athletic programs, but makes on-court success and financial health
unlikely. Some guarantee-contract terms may violate contract law
principles against unconscionability. More likely, some guarantee
contracts violate public policy. This may especially be true for
HBCUs due to the articulated governmental interest in their preserva-
tion. HBCUs may be better served by adopting contracting strategies
for Men's basketball similar to those they already use for football,
combined with some used by the Las Vegas Invitational and the Big
Apple Classic. If committed and culturally aware promoters can be
found, such contracting strategies could be used in the creation of the
HBCU Invitational, an early-season HBCU tournament that would
supplant guarantee games, celebrate African-American culture and
HBCU traditions, and bring a measure of financial stability to HBCU
athletic programs.
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